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Style, Philosophy, and Scientific Writing 
Michael G. Cooke 
In 1972 Myrna Gopnick's study, Linguistic Structures in 
Scientific Texts , was published in Paris . It concerned itself with 
materials "selected at random from the Proceedings of the 
Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology." But 
FASEB itself was not "selected at random." Rather, Mrs. Gopnik 
announced a "primary" and a "second strong requirement" that this 
material satisfied, to wit, "that the texts concerned be as free as 
possible from stylistic variation," and "that the semantic content of 
the texts be as explicity stated as possible and as free from outside 
references as possible." Within the terms of her study, she explains, 
"what is interesting" about a text is "not the particular set of 
transformations which generated" it, but "the information which is 
carried by these transformations." She concedes, in a footnote, that 
" this assumption would not hold true" for literary texts. 1 
Not enough is said of "literary texts" to make them more than a 
passing foil for "scientific texts," and it is the latter which are of 
present concern. Mrs. Gopnik's scientific approach to "scientific 
texts" is not only posited as description, but is raised into a norm, a 
law. Scientific texts should conform to this standard; Mrs. Gopnik 
takes it for granted that "the style of the text will be free from 
any . .. transformations which could in any way obscure the 
content of the texts" (pp. 11-12). 
This is not the place to inquire into the personality that accepts, 
or the mood of a society that adopts such a law, with its espousal 
of seemingly monotonous and sterile writing. But it is necessary to 
question the air of impartiality, literalness, factuality, and material 
purity with which Mrs. Gopnik seems to endow her texts : "It is 
certainly easier to determine the meaning of a technical word like 
cyclophosphoramide than of a non-technical word like justice. Since 
technical terms have this well defined range of meanings ... the 
problems of reference and the choice between possible ambiguous 
transformational routes is somewhat reduced" ~p. 12). 
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We find in fact that, while stressing cold content and narrowing 
down to the simplest value of individual words, Mrs . Gopnik is 
concerned with more than information and description. She 
acknowledges this. She presupposes "a coherent text," and grants 
that "not every sequence of sentences," even though scientifically 
accurate, produces such a thing (p. 9). She suggests that "syntactic 
and semantic" criteria (p. 13) are necessary to establish "texthood." 
But will these in fact suffice? Mrs. Gopnik continually uses 
"reoccurrence" as a gauge of coherence, without inquiring into the 
structural and tonal effects of that device, or touching on the issue 
of conceptual fit where numerous and complex elements must come 
together (cohere) in one presentation. In short, one must wonder 
whether "scientific texts," even those that are "as free as possible 
from stylistic variation" and "outside references," do not carry 
within themselves an interpretive scheme, a preferential principle of 
ordering and construing material, as well as an attitude and an 
intention vis-a-vis both materials and audience? 
Is it in fact possible for the text, as text, to partake of the formal 
insularity and the technical purity of the instruments and the 
process whereby its subject matter is produced? The ideal, or rather 
the idea of a text clinically pure, infallibly clear, and irresistibly 
sure goes back to that milestone in the development of modern 
science, the founding of the Royal Society of London for Improving 
Natural Knowledge, in Restoration England. Bishop Thomas Sprat, 
in his contemporary History of the Royal Society, speaks of 
"primitive purity and shortness," and imagines men who "deliver'd 
so many things almost in an equal number of words," with a 
premium on "positive expressions, clear senses ... bringing all 
things as near the Mathematical plainness" as possible. 2 
This stylistic norm, canonizing simplicity, clarity, accuracy, 
concreteness, and objectivity, rested on a presumption that not only 
research but the researcher could be antiseptic and neutral. The 
object, as Thomas Sprat put it in his History, was "to attain a solid 
speculation ... by a long forbearing of speculation at first, till the 
matter be ripe for it; and not by madly rushing upon it in the very 
beginning.''3 But Werner Heisenberg, an eminent modern physicist 
and theorist of science, leaves no doubt that the choice of an 
experiment, to say nothing of the chooser, affects what we call its 
reality . Perfect neutrality and objectivity are not to be had. Indeed, 
Heisenberg's chapter on "Language and Reality in Modern Physics," 
in Physics and Philosophy, makes it clear that not even agreement 
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is to be had among scientists. Real convictions and passions, 
conceivably even assumptions and prejudices, bear on scientific 
findings, and on scientists' responses thereto. Perhaps Heisenberg 
unwittingly harbors the old simon-pure ideal of scientific writing; 
he contends that the problem will pass, that "one has not yet found 
the correct language with which to speak about the new situation." 
As he goes on to remark that the "improved experimental technique 
of our time brings into the scope of science new aspects of nature," 
one is hard put to see when the "correct" language will materialize. 4 
But the elusiveness of an ultimately and utterly correct language 
reflects more than the changing dimensions and conditions of 
scientific inquiry. It reflects at bottom the condition of language 
itself. The process of research, rendered in language, takes on not 
only a different form but also a new character. The process may 
dwell on what Bishop Sprat calls things, but the adoption of words 
goes beyond that mere matching and numerical correspondence 
which Sprat conjures up . As the eminent theorist and philosopher 
of language, Jacques Derrida, has remarked, "there is no linguistic 
neutrality." And it is a scientist who points out the aptness of that 
contention for scientific writing. In Chance and Necessity, Jacques 
Monod, a Nobel laureate in physiology, plainly speaks of the 
biologist's "efforts to 'understand' the entire functioning of the 
human brain, " indeed of the human being.5 
Mrs. Gopnik's study, after a lapse of more than two centuries, 
seeks to institutionalize and codify the values that Bishop Sprat and 
the Royal Society espoused. But, in spite of Heisenberg's stubborn 
dream of a "correct language," both science and linguistic 
philosophy bring the project under serious suspicion. The Sprat-
Gopnik formula is, for all its unassuming neutrality of surface, 
vigorously leading and even dogmatic in relation to its audience. It 
is no less personal and bound to the world of style than the literary 
modes it sets itself against. Like a plain gray dress at a fashionable 
soiree, it expresses a commitment and a mission, and is no less 
passionate and purposive and problematical than Euphuism, or 
legalese. In a way scientific writing may depend as much on the 
"writing" as on the "science" for its effect. 
Let us take a few famous examples of scientific writing, and see 
how far they reconcile the dual interests of science as objective 
knowledge and of science as human understanding . In the process, 
there should arise a fair opportunity to say something about science 
and its hold on modern culture, and about writing, as an arcane 
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symbolic activity, and its relation to the supposed objectivity and 
standardization of science. 
It will benefit us, in this analysis, to keep in mind that one of the 
earliest ideas of systematic scientific inquiry, as Lucretius records, 
was to deliver mankind from superstition and darkness of mind. (A 
synonym for "superstition" might be religion, for "darkness of 
mind" symbolism.) In any case, science begins in ancient times with 
a program; it takes a stand in relation to social and intellectual 
authority. In his Novum Organum, Sir Francis Bacon, at the 
threshold of the modern scheme, makes the program explicit: 
"Scientia et potentia in idem coincidunt, " which reads in English, 
"Knowledge (Science) and power boil down to the same thing" 
(italics added). 6 
We have to be cautious around the shrine of disinterested 
factuality reared by science. The problem goes beyond the fact that 
science always has a tacit program. It compounds itself by virtue of 
the fact, cogently articulated by Heidegger, that the total system of 
human discovery, of which science is but a part, always occurs in a 
context, and cannot attain to either absoluteness or absolution from 
what Mrs. Gopnik calls "outside reference." As Croce says, "there 
are no immobile facts , nor can such things be envisaged in the 
world of reality. Historical judgment is embodied even in the 
merest perception of the judging mind."7 Or again we can listen to 
John Steinbeck and Edward F. Ricketts: " the impulse which drives a 
man to poetry will send another man into the tide pools and force 
him to try to report what he finds there. "8 
If we turn first to Darwin to represent scientific style, we can see 
at once how involved a matter it can be to set forth the so-called 
facts of nature. We will never know how long Darwin might have 
brooded over his Origin of Species if A. R. Wallace had not 
independently worked out a comparable formulation based on 
analogous data . He waited, we do know, from 1844 to 1858 to 
come out with his findings, and why? Because they were as much 
power as fact, as much an ordination of meaning as an 
organization of details. And the meaning would be scandalous to 
his society, to his world; as the wife of the Bishop of Worcester 
would say : "Descended from apes! My dear, let us hope it is not 
so; but if it is, let us hope it does not become genera lly known. " 
How does Darwin write, how does he meet the total situation, 
the complex state and quality of his material? How does he meet 
our minds and construct our positions through his writing? Is he 
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not working to take in the reader with all the disarming 
diminuendos of his "Introduction," in statements such as "these 
facts ... seemed to throw some light on the origin of species" 
(italics added)? Is he not guarding against doubt with the most 
cautious, circumspect, and indeed nun-like crescendo ever produced 
to announce an epochal discovery and concept? Darwin carefully 
shows that he takes half a decade to allow himself to "speculate on 
the subject," another brace of years to do "a sketch of the 
conclusions" that "seemed ... probable," and then a decade and a 
half of assiduous labor before allowing himself to be persuaded by 
eminent scientists to publish "some brief extracts" which even so 
"must necessarily be imperfect."9 
Nor is the body of the text free from rhetorical manipulation. Let 
us look closely at the opening sentences of The Origin of Species: 
When we compare the individuals of the same variety or sub-
variety of older cultivated plants and animals, one of the first 
points which strikes us is, that they generally differ more from 
each other than do individuals of any one species or variety in 
a state of nature. And if we reflect on the vast diversity of the 
plants and animals which have been cultivated, and which 
have varied during all ages under the most different climates 
and treatment, we are driven to conclude that this great 
variability is due to our domestic productions having been 
raised under conditions of life not so uniform as, and 
somewhat different from, those to which the parent species 
had been exposed under nature. (p. 104) 
For myself it is necessary to confess that, even with Darwin's 
expert help, the degree of difference between cultivated and wild 
plants is not one of the first points to strike me, nor is the 
comparison the first to come to my mind. But I am either 
implicated in Darwin's conclusion, or cowed by the implied 
multitude of authorities in agreement that his simple pronoun, 
"we," inevitably arrays before me. In either case, resistance and 
shock dwindle. An authority at once soothing and coercive is 
established, and is secured by the careful detail and careful 
complexity of rhythm and thought ("raised under conditions of life 
not so uniform as, and somewhat different from") . This authority 
of the "we" seems virtually comprehensive. The reader is co-opted 
and quieted. The worst thing to be said of Darwin's various 
opponents remains to be said, namely, that they had no sense of 
style. 
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What, though, of the "I" presented in the "Introduction"? The 
scrupulous, apologetic "I", so slow to take any position, so fearful 
of offending? It is important to recognize the authority of that "I", 
an authority working as a complement to that of the "we". Indeed, 
it works as its obverse, the way an olive branch is the best obverse 
of the coin that boasts the imperious Caesar. 
These two authorities or controlling postures continue 
throughout The Origin of Species. It will be of value to look at one 
illustrative passage where Darwin is going full cry, and where, 
incidentally, the claims of the opening sentences as to the 
differences in variety arising between domestication and the wild 
state seem to be contradicted. He is talking about the almost 
limitless variety possible in time and in the state of nature, and 
seeking to fit this to the principle of "the survival of the fittest," 
seeking to introduce an interest if not a teleology into the seemingly 
random plethora of nature. 
Mere chance, as we may call it, ·might cause one variety to 
differ in some character from its parents, and the offspring of 
this variety again to differ from its parent in the very same 
character and in a greater degree; but this alone would never 
account for so habitual and large a degree of difference as that 
between the species of the same genus. As has always been 
my practice, I have sought light on this head from our 
domestic productions. We shall find here something 
analogous. (p. 137) 
By now the "I" is a bit firmer in its ethos, counting on our trust 
in its regularity and diligence for the "light"; and the "we" can 
correspondingly be seen enlarging its range as it moves from 
common observation ("one of the first points which strikes us") to 
singular prophecy ("we shall find"). 
Having indicated how "two well-established and distinct breeds" 
of horses can develop over centuries from "one nation or district" 
requiring swifter animals whilst "another required strong or 
bulkier" ones, Darwin takes up the underlying issue of a non-
human, as it were spontaneous influence on species. 
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How, it may be asked, can any analogous principle apply in 
nature? I believe it can and does apply most efficiently 
(though it was a long time before I saw how), from the simple 
circumstance that the more diversified the descendants from 
any one species become in structure, constitution, and habits, 
by so much will they be better enabled to seize on many and 
widely diversified places in the polity of nature, and so be 
enabled to increase in numbers. We can clearly discern this in 
the case of animals with simple habits. (p. 139) 
This passage brings out the basic purpose of the insinuations of 
Darwin's "I" and "we", namely, to gain an advantage in an 
argumentative situation. He uses analogy continually in The Origin 
of Species. Here he confronts the question of its legitimacy and 
efficacy, and answers with a Q .E.D. , as domestic animals shed light 
on "carnivorous quadrupeds," and what holds true for them holds 
true also for plants (p. 138). But the analogies in the realm of the 
material are not independently or neutrally taken up. They 
reinforce a primary analogy in the relationship Darwin bears to his 
reader. His "I" is analogous to the cautious, even skeptical reader, 
who deplores humbug and scandal and who is convinced only 
because of overwhelming evidence, and his "we" is analogous to the 
proud, all-comprehending reader, who would never lag behind in 
matters of reason and truth . Not that Darwin plucked these 
personae out of the air, with sly rhetorical intent. They are genuine 
moods, stages, values in his autobiography and in ours. 
The name of D'Arcy Thompson is not widely known, and may 
seem rashly paired with Darwin's. But Thompson's name, where it 
is known, is revered at a rate not far behind Darwin's. He was born 
the year after publication of The Origin of Species , that is in 1860, 
and died in 1948. Thompson grew up in two cultures, both 
nationally and intellectually; his father was English, his mother 
French, and he was an accomplished classicist as well as an original 
biologist. His book, On Growth and Form (1917) , is still regarded 
as a classic of modern biology, and some of us regard it as a classic 
of English writing. 
Thompson is an avowed materialist. He basically attempts to use 
mathematics " to describe and physics to explain, the fabric of the 
body" and so we should expect a thoroughly "scientific" text. That, 
I suggest, is what we get, not in ter~s of facts but of meanings, not 
according to finality (still a bugaboo of scentific thinking) but 
according to the maximum possible system of relationship. 
Thompson applies the principle of analogy that Darwin formulates 
and defends, and he does so with a dexterity, range and precision 
that any poet might envy. As he himself, the consummate 
materialist declares, "Physical science and philosophy stand side by 
side, and one upholds the other."10 
What, then, is Thompson's philosophy? We know that he 
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thought natural selection an eliminative, not a creative force, and 
held to physical forces, molecular or mechanical, as the causes of 
adaptation. But that is not the only, or the first "philosophy" 
manifested in the writing. Here is a representative excerpt from his 
prose: 
To turn one circle (or sphere) into two circles (or spheres) 
would be, from the point of view of the mathematician, an 
extraordinarily difficult transformation; but, physically 
speaking, its achievement may be extremely simple. The little 
round gourd grows naturally , by its symmetrical forces of 
expansive growth, into a big, round, or somewhat oval 
pumpkin or melon . But the Moorish husbandman ties a rag 
around its middle, and the same forces of growth, unaltered 
save for the presence of this trammel, now expand the 
globular structure into two superposed and connected 
globes .... It is clear, I think, that we may account for 
many ordinary biological processes of development or 
transformation of form by the existence of trammels or lines 
of constraint .... This case has a close parallel in the 
operations of the glass-blower .... (pp. 286-87) 
We note at once that Thompson, like Darwin, introduces himself 
("I think") and has recourse to the first person plural pronoun ("we 
may account . . . "). But in On Growth and Form these are 
incidental touches, sequins, rather than part of the fabric of the 
thought. At the same time it is clear that Thompson draws in many 
more personal elements and considerations than Darwin. His 
person, the singular human presence, is less in evidence, but his 
personality, the extent and character of his interests, much more 
urgent. This difference perhaps reflects the fact that Thompson has 
no specific, localized, distinguishable, concrete subject, such as 
Darwin's species and natura1 selection . His topic is abstract, all-
comprehending, and everything is reduced to an illustration of the 
concept of growth and form. Thus Thompson looks at once more 
conceptual and more imagistic than Darwin. 
In a sense, Thompson can never prove, or theorize, like Darwin, 
but only point. It is the richness and facility of his pointing that give 
him authority . If he can never be final or exhaustive, he can 
nevertheless be satisfying and even stunning to the reader. In the 
brief passage on transformation before us, we encounter "marbled 
paper" in a spacious paragraph, then pivot to the question of how, 
mathematically, one circle may be turned into two, which instantly 
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produces the Moorish husbandman making two gourds out of one 
and as many forms of standard gourds as he exerts himself to do 
(we look back and know that the mathematician is worsted here 
too). Thompson then briefly generalizes about the relation of 
"trammels or lines of constraint" to "uniform and symmetrical" 
patterns of growth and is led thus to glass-blowing, and thence, 
with a bow to Oliver Wendell Holmes, to the alimentary canal, and 
then to the difference between glass that is blown and glass that is 
mechanically made. 
It is a wide and weird assortment, and bears directly as such on 
what Thompson is doing to the reader. Thompson's is a style of 
insistent variety, no doubt necessitated by the abstraction and all-
inclusiveness of his topic, but also, it must seem, assumed to apply 
a personal, rhetorical force to the growth and form of the reader's 
mind on his subject. 
We can hear our subjection and Thompson's insistence in the 
details and in the rhythm of one climactic section: 
Nature does just what the glass-blower does, and, we might 
even say, no more than he. For she can expand the tube here 
and narrow it there; thicken its walls or thin them; blow off a 
lateral off-shoot or caecal diverticulum; bend the tube, or 
twist and coil it; and infold or crimp its walls as, so to speak, 
she pleases. Such a form as that of the human stomach is 
easily explained when it is regarded from this point of view; it 
is simply an ill-blown bubble, a bubble that has been rendered 
lopsided by a trammel or restraint along one side, such as to 
prevent its symmetrical expansion-such a trammel as is 
produced if the glass-blower lets one side of his bubble get 
cold, and such as is actually present in the stomach itself in 
the form of a muscular band .U 
Our only consolation has to be our perception of Thompson's 
devotion to the idea of matter, of forces molecular or mechanical. 
That is human, as is the Moorish husbandman who affords a sense 
of hierarchy if not exemption in Thompson's scheme of growth and 
form. 
At this point I am left with the temptation to ask: What force 
caused Thompson to write? Is writing encompassed in his idea of 
matter, the digestion and incorporation of ideas as well as food? 
And as to Darwin, why did he see fit to write, when he feared to 
perish if he published? When we think of all our reasons for not 
writing, whether it be grocery lists, love letters, applications, 
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treatises, autobiographies, cultural history, theology ... , the 
productions of Darwin and Thompson in relation to the implied 
obstacles take on great significance. 
It seems fair to say that anyone who writes is looking not just to 
be an author but an authority. We live in an age that betrays two 
extremes of emphasis, on the internal constitution of humankind 
and on the external constitution of matter. Both extremes have 
generated an enormous literature, almost in spite of themselves. 
The overemphasis on the internal should result in solipsism, but it 
results in Freud and Jung and Adler, and so on exponentially by the 
generation. The overemphasis on the external should lead to ant-
like mechanism, but instead it leads to Heisenberg, Crick, Sagan, 
Luria, Thomas, and so on. Each has its authors, its need for 
authority. And scientific writers no less than poets, are moved by a 
magical sense of control, by the possibilities of revelation, 
definition, and orientation (or instrumental efficacy) in the world. 
They too write to confirm and preserve experience, to satisfy an 
intrinsic as well as a social impulse; and are as subject to frustration 
of that social impulse as any poet. 
And yet there is a favoritism toward science in our culture. 
Mankind perennially loves a story, and in today's society evinces a 
singular longing for facts. And science, in unrivalled measure, has 
in its hands the opportunity to satisfy the appetite for facts along 
with the need for stories; biologists and physicists, rather than 
theologians and philosophers, are telling the story of the origin of 
the universe, its history, its spawning of man, its symmetries and 
crises and serendipities. 
It is odd, by which I mean ungenerous and a touch suicidal, for 
science to be setting a standard of monotony and sterility as its 
distinctive style. This is a false and, for all but the most relentless 
mediocrity, impossible style. More, it is a dangerous one. For it 
denies time, which is the medium of science despite its fondness for 
repetition, and which is the medium of man, the medium in which 
we learn what we inherit and what we suffer (Thompson's forces), 
in which we recognize the patterns and principles (Darwin's 
processes) which apply constantly to us and to which we may as 
constantly apply ourselves. 
I think of Darwin in the Galapagos, and realize how critical that 
experience was for modern culture. But when I think of Darwin 
writing, I am convinced that I have come closer to the essential act 
or condition of his impact and influence. Not the mere writing, but 
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the impulse to write, the ground of continuity between ancient 
symbolism and modern science. Darwin writing is akin, for me, to 
Orpheus singing in spite of death, the Swan singing because of 
death, and Scheherazade singing to ward death off. Scientific 
writing occurs to turn facts, which Coleridge called, "as facts, 
essentially fixed and dead," into the art of knowledge and power, 
scientia et potentia . 
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